Voluntary carbon markets, such as the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), were worth $90 million in 2006. This paper finds that community forestry interventions of three organizations in India are eligible to sell carbon sequestration credits on CCX. Their combined annual sequestration potential is 104,427 tons of carbon dioxide (tCO 2 ), worth $417,708 at 2007 prices. Although this value will be difficult to realize immediately, it indicates the potential for carbon sequestration to raise rural incomes in India. These benefits can be actualized by first linking small pilot projects with CCX and then scaling up operations. Projects will also need to reduce transaction costs to raise the shares of carbon revenue that farmers receive. The diversion of land to raise tree crops needs to be balanced with food security concerns. A potentially viable approach would be to take up carbon plantations on common lands with concerned agencies acting as a liaison between farmer groups and the market.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper looks at the potential for community forestry projects in India to sell carbon sequestration credits 1 on voluntary carbon markets. Ever since the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol 2 in 2005, there has been an expectation that forestry projects in developing countries could improve local incomes by selling carbon sequestration credits to industrialized countries. 3 However, the slow approval of forestry projects by the Protocol's Executive Board has meant that the Kyoto-based market for carbon sequestration credits has hardly taken off (Murphy, 2006) . 4 Instead, voluntary carbon markets have emerged in many parts of the world.
Voluntary carbon markets pertain to trading in all carbon offsets that are not required by regulation. Unlike markets, such as the European Union Emission Trading Scheme, that exist to support compliance with legislated carbon emissions caps, voluntary markets represent voluntary attempts by individuals and organizations to reduce their carbon emissions (Bayon, Hawa and Hamilton, 2007) . These markets have shown impressive growth in recent years. They grew 200 per cent by volume between 2005 and 2006 and are now valued at more than $90 million (Hamilton and others, 2007) . One important voluntary market operates through the United States-based Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX). CCX is a voluntary cap-and-trade programme that requires its members (businesses and other large entities such as Ford, DuPont, IBM, Motorola and the city of Chicago) to reduce their carbon emissions by 1 per cent every year starting from their average annual emissions for the period 1998-2001. Members that cannot reduce their own emissions can buy carbon credits from others. Since its inception in 2003, CCX has traded 26.3 million tons of carbon dioxide (tCO 2 ), including 10.3 million tCO 2 worth $36.1 million transacted in 2006 alone, making it one of the world's largest carbon markets (see table 1). A key point to note is that voluntary carbon markets, including CCX, have sourced a significant proportion of their carbon credits from forestry projects that sequester carbon (Hamilton and 1 Carbon credits or offsets are units of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) that forests absorb (or sequester) from the atmosphere. The Protocol requires industrialized countries to reduce their carbon emissions by an average of 5 per cent by 2012. Under its Clean Development Mechanism, developing countries can sell carbon sequestered by their forests to industrialized countries as carbon credits or carbon offsets (UNEP, 2004) . 4 Under the Kyoto Protocol, all forestry practices that are eligible to generate carbon sequestration credits are part for what is called the LULUCF sector, i.e. land use, land use change and forestry. emerged others, 2007). Accordingly, carbon sequestration for international voluntary carbon markets could be a viable income-earning opportunity for community forestry projects.
Most researchers and policymakers in India and elsewhere appear to be unaware of the growth of the voluntary carbon sector. While there are several studies that look at the potential for selling carbon credits under the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (e.g. Aune, Alemu and Gautam, 2005; Ravindranath, Pandey and others, 2001) , there are hardly any that explore the feasibility of linking forestry projects with CCX or any other voluntary market. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature by examining how forestry projects can sell carbon sequestration credits on voluntary markets. Although the paper focuses on India, the discussion here is also relevant for community forestry projects in other developing countries.
To preserves clarity in discussions and with a view towards practical application, the paper mainly considers the case for selling carbon credits on CCX. Where necessary, it also considers broader issues and areas of concern. It is based on our field research with three prominent organizations in India: Seva Mandir, the Foundation for Ecological Security (FES) and the International Small Group and Tree Planting Program (TIST). These organizations provide a diverse institutional backdrop for the study. Seva Mandir and FES are non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that implement forestry activities but have not traded any carbon credits. TIST, on the other hand, is one of the few organizations in India to have successfully sold forest-based sequestration credits. We compare and contrast the experiences of the three organizations to draw lessons for others who wish to enter carbon markets. What kinds of forestry projects are eligible to sell carbon credits? What important rules govern such sales? We also focus on the economic benefits of carbon trading by estimating additional income that local farmers can make from selling carbon credits. Finally, we look at the policy implications of important issues such as leakage, permanence and transaction costs that affect the sustainability of carbon sequestration projects.
II. DATA AND METHODS
This study draws on project records of the three community forestry programmes in India and interviews with both project officials and villagers participating in the programmes. Data include the areas of tree plantations for all projects and the actual number of trees per hectare in areas working with TIST. For FES and Seva Mandir, project records indicate the areas of community forestry plantations but tree growth must be estimated based on typical growth rates in the study area. Potential income from carbon sequestration is then estimated based on conversion to carbon and prevailing CCX prices.
Interviews with project officials and villagers yielded qualitative data regarding the three community forestry programmes and perceptions of issues that might arise if efforts are made to sell carbon credits on CCX. The study was exploratory, seeking to gain an initial understanding of these key issues. As such, it was conducted through informal interviews with no formal sampling.
The context: community forestry initiatives in India
Seva Mandir, FES, and TIST all implement various kinds of forestry activities in India. The common aim of these activities is to strengthen rural livelihoods by improving the productivity of local resources. Seva Mandir works in more than 580 villages of the Udaipur and Rajsamand districts in south Rajasthan to reverse the ecological degradation of village common lands, 5 which are often overexploited and unable to fulfil local needs (Seva Mandir, 2006) . Seva Mandir pursues several approaches to restore productivity, including:
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Apart from privately owned lands, there exist several kinds of common lands in India: revenue lands (owned by the Government Revenue Department), forest lands (owned by the State Forest Department) and panchayat grazing lands (owned by the Revenue Department, but the village panchayats are the custodians).
• Pasture land development on panchayat grazing lands. A panchayat is a democratically elected village level government in India. Such panchayats exist all over India and, apart from being responsible for local level administration, they are also custodians of certain kinds of common lands, particularly grazing lands. Each village's project management institution 6 obtains permission from the local panchayat to manage the land by planting trees to create tree plantations and protecting them from open grazing. Protection also helps in the regeneration of existing root stock that further improves the tree density on such lands. Villagers can collect grass, dried tree branches, and bamboo shoots through manual harvesting.
• Joint forest management of forest lands, which allows local communities to manage forest lands under the relevant 1991 guidelines of Indian state governments. Seva Mandir assists village institutions in obtaining permission from the Forest Department of their respective state before constructing a boundary wall and creating tree plantations by adding to existing forests. Joint forest management regulations stipulate that villagers can harvest grass and other non-timber forest products from the forest land in addition to receiving a fixed share of timber revenues if the mature trees are harvested at any time.
• Plantations on private lands under which small and marginal farmers receive financial and technical support for tree plantations on small patches of land that are usually less than 1 hectare in size.
The Foundation for Ecological Security is working to restore about 73,000 hectares of degraded lands in ecologically fragile areas across seven states in India.
7 The target beneficiaries are about 100,000 rural households, 80 per cent of which belong to the landless, small or marginal farmer categories. Through its work, the foundation has been able to generate more than 4.4 million days of employment for these poor households (Foundation for Ecological Security, 2005) . Its approaches include the following:
6
In each village where it works, Seva Mandir helps establish a village-level institution to help manage its projects. This management institution is elected by the local people but is entirely separate from the panchayat. Acting as an apex body to oversee all the projects, it can appoint committees to deal with individual projects or the management of specific natural resources.
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The states concerned are Gujarat, Rajasthan, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Uttaranchal.
• Regeneration of panchayat grazing lands and revenue wastelands through plantation and protection activities. Village communities obtain permission from respective panchayats or from the Revenue Department (in the case of revenue wastelands) before initiating the work. Villagers have access to all non-timber forest products from regenerated sites.
• Joint forest management activities carried out by the Foundation for Ecological Security are similar to those of Seva Mandir, except that the Foundation works in multiple agro-ecological zones in India while Seva Mandir works in only one region.
• Watershed development 8 consists of several different interventions, such as soil and moisture conservation, afforestation and construction of water harvesting structures on contiguous patches of land that include both private and common lands.
Unlike Seva Mandir, the Foundation does not normally work with individual farmers on private lands and its groups tend to be somewhat larger than those in Seva Mandir projects. Also, while Seva Mandir's activity is limited to new afforestation, the Foundation also works to regenerate existing forested lands.
To gather data from officials and farmers participating in projects under these two organizations, the first author visited five villages in each of their project zones and held informal interviews with villagers and project staff. Some discussions were held in villages and others in farmers' fields and at afforestation sites. The author cross-checked his findings by engaging in multiple discussions in different locations, probing deeper to resolve points of contention or where explanations were unclear. He also organized a half-day workshop for programme staff and farmer representatives from the Forest Department, the Foundation for Ecological Security, Seva Mandir and other local non-governmental organizations to discuss the major issues and hear different perspectives on them.
The International Small Group and Tree Planting Program is a community forestry initiative of the United States-based Clean Air Action Corporation and
Institute for Environmental Innovation. The initiative was launched in the state of Tamil Nadu, India, in 2003 with the objective of helping local farmers improve their incomes by engaging in carbon sequestration activities on their farms. Participating farmers are organized into small groups and encouraged to create tree plantations.
8
Seva Mandir also has a watershed development programme. The area covered under its forestry sub-component is already included in the above estimates.
The major tree species preferred by these groups include casuarina (Casuarina equisetifolia), neem (Azadirachta indica), various eucalyptus species and fruit trees such as mango (Mangifera indica). Each group has a separate contract with TIST under which carbon sequestration credits are transferred by the group members to TIST in return for annual payments of 1.48 Indian rupees (Rs) ($0.037) per live tree.
9 TIST then sells these carbon credits to various business entities at a price of $5-$20 per ton of CO 2 , depending on volume and timing. In recent years, TIST has even sold carbon credits to individuals through the web auction site eBay (Hawn, 2006) . In all, TIST has formed 260 groups consisting of about 2,500 local farmers in India. These groups manage more than 670,000 trees and receive a total annual carbon payment of Rs. 991,600 (about $24,790) for protecting these trees.
To collect data on TIST projects, the first author travelled to project areas and met farmers in their fields. Some of these meetings were arranged by TIST, while others occurred by chance. Discussions were held with members of 10 different tree growing groups under TIST out of the more than 200 groups that operate in Tamil Nadu.
III. TRADING CARBON ON THE CHICAGO CLIMATE EXCHANGE
CCX offers a feasible opportunity for community forestry projects to sell carbon credits where the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism did not. Even though the CDM envisaged the transfer of carbon sequestration credits from developing to industrialized countries (Fenhann and others, 2004) , it has hardly worked in practice. This is because the current rules of the CDM are very restrictive: they only allow afforestation and reforestation projects, they exclude avoided deforestation and they have rigid guidelines on how carbon stocks are monitored and verified in the field. In addition, projects face high transaction costs in terms of paying for third-party verification of their carbon stocks and in searching for potential investors to buy their carbon credits. Studies estimate that an average project adds $200,000 to its costs in order to be approved as a CDM project (Murphy, 2006) . Since each project also needs to be approved by the host country, any delay in getting this approval further escalates the transaction costs. As a result, it is very difficult and expensive for community forestry projects to sell carbon sequestration credits through the CDM (only one forestry project has been 9 These payments are distributed in four quarterly instalments so that farmers receive money on a regular basis rather than a single annual payment. $1 = Rs 40.
approved to date). Finally, as 2008 approaches, the window of opportunity for new projects will close, as there will not be enough time for projects to get approval and sell carbon sequestration credits before the Kyoto Protocol's current commitment period ends in 2008 (Lecocq and Amrosi, 2007) .
Instead, voluntary carbon markets, such as CCX, offer an attractive alternative. The rules for selling carbon sequestration credits are simpler (as explained below), avoided deforestation projects are included, and most small and medium-sized projects do not need to hire third-party verifiers. Unlike CDM, projects follow a simple registration process with no requirement of separate host country approval.
CCX is one of the few carbon markets to allow trading in carbon sequestration credits from land use and forestry projects (called CCX forest carbon emission offsets). In order to sell carbon credits on CCX, forestry projects must meet certain requirements. First, they need to have been initiated after 1 January 1990 on deforested or degraded land. Second, afforestation projects are eligible for carbon sequestration, but conservation (reforestation and avoided deforestation) projects are only eligible if they are carried out in conjunction with afforestation on a contiguous site. 10 Third, projects are required to demonstrate a long-term commitment to maintaining carbon stocks in forestry. Projects that fulfil these three requirements are classified on the basis of their annual carbon sequestration potential: projects that sequester less than 2,000 tCO 2 per annum are small, those that sequester between 2,000 tCO 2 and 12,500 tCO 2 per annum are medium and those that sequester more than 12,500 tCO 2 per annum are large. Size determines monitoring requirements for each project, with independent third-party verification of carbon stocks required for large projects.
If the three rules and the monitoring requirements are satisfied, the three forestry projects in India can potentially sell carbon credits on CCX based on their annual carbon sequestration potential. It is worth noting that the three rules allow some flexibility, within reason. For example, projects must demonstrate that they are serious about the long-term conservation of the trees that are planted. In India, building a fence or wall around an afforested site helps to demonstrate seriousness because it is essential for keeping out animals that would prevent tree growth by grazing the seedlings.
Estimating carbon sequestration potential
Carbon sequestration potential is the amount of CO 2 fixed by plants through their photosynthetic activity. Although plants fix CO 2 both as above-ground biomass and below-ground soil carbon, CCX rules currently allow trading only in above-ground biomass contained in live plants.
11 Poffenberger and others (2002) estimate that in India, the above-ground mean annual growth in degraded forests from protection and plantation was 3 tons of carbon per hectare (tC/ha) . 12 Similarly, Murali, Murthy and Ravindranath (2002) quote Seebauer (1992) to report a national mean annual increment of 3.6 tC/ha for plantations. Aggarwal and others (2006) arrive at a higher estimate of 5.24 tC/ha for Rajasthan, but their sample plots also include primary forests under protection, which skews their calculations upward. Fewer estimates are available for plantations on revenue or panchayat lands. A relevant study by the Foundation for Ecological Security reports a mean annual increment of 1 to 3 tC/ha (Mondal, Sing and Dhameliya, 2005) . Annual carbon sequestration is usually taken as half of the mean annual increment (Poffenberger and others, 2002) . By taking the lower bounds of the above estimates (to account for various uncertainties related to species mix, survival rates and specific soil conditions), the total carbon sequestration potential of projects under the three organizations works out to be 104,427 tCO 2 per year (tables 2 and 3).
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Compatibility with CCX rules
All three organizations have a significant number of carbon sequestration credits that can potentially be sold through CCX. Since these credits pertain to post-1990 plantations on unforested (in the case of panchayat, revenue or privately owned lands) or degraded (in the case of forest lands) lands, they satisfy the first rule.
The second rule is important for plantations on forest lands. All three of the organizations create new tree plantations on degraded or deforested lands, which qualify them under rule two. In addition, both Seva Mandir and the Foundation for Ecological Security encourage the regeneration of old trees on forest lands as, typically, forest lands in India have a residual rootstock that can quickly 11 Below-ground carbon sequestration is difficult to measure and depends on a number of variables. CCX does not trade in below-ground carbon credits from forestry because it does not have a standard protocol for doing so.
12 1 ton C = 3.67 tCO 2 13 TIST carbon credits are presented in a separate table because data comparable to the other two projects are not available. Source: Authors' calcultions from data on the TIST website (www.tist.org). a TIST keeps a record of the total number of live trees.
b Ideally, estimates of carbon sequestration should be based on the specific dimensions of each tree, but age and size distribution is not known. Based on information from TIST, we have used the following approximation to estimate annual sequestration potential from TIST plantations: The average number of trees per hectare is 400. The mean annual increment is 3.5 tC/ha. Annual carbon sequestration is assumed to be 50 per cent of mean annual increment, measured in terms of tC/ha, which is multiplied by 3.67 to get tCO 2 /ha. regenerate through protection (Ravindranath, Sudha and Rao, 2001; Poffenberger and others, 2002) . It is important to note that, apart from constructing a boundary wall around these old forests, both Seva Mandir and the Foundation for Ecological Security also begin new tree plantations on the same forest lands. This qualifies their forest land projects under the second CCX rule, which states that forest conservation is eligible in conjunction with new afforestation efforts on contiguous sites.
Additionality, leakage and permanence
A review of CCX rules indicates that Seva Mandi, the Foundation for Ecological Security and TIST are all eligible to sell carbon sequestration credits from their forestry activities. Typically, international trading in carbon sequestration credits also requires fulfilling additionality, leakage and permanence clauses (Fenhann and others, 2004) .
Additionality requires proving that carbon sequestration credits being claimed by a project are additional to any that would have occurred in the absence of the project. There are various ways to ascertain additionality, one of them being the timing of the project, requiring developers to demonstrate that they initiated the project after a specific date (Bayon, Hawn and Hanitton, 2007) . CCX follows this method by allowing carbon trading from forestry projects that were established after 1 January 1990. This may not be as strict as the additionality clause under the Kyoto Protocol's CDM, which is precisely why community forestry projects should sell carbon credits on voluntary markets. Since only the post-1990 forestry activities of the three organizations are considered in this study, they qualify under the CCX additionality clause.
Carbon trading requires sequestration projects to prove that there is no leakage of carbon dioxide and that all carbon stocks are permanent. No leakage means that project beneficiaries do not cut any trees, even outside the project boundary. This is a contentious issue, as local communities often depend on forest resources for their livelihood needs, such as obtaining fodder for livestock, firewood for energy needs and fruits for consumption or sale in nearby markets. Leakage occurs if people simply shift tree-cutting to lands not under contract. Permanence refers to a long-term commitment to protect carbon plantations. For local communities, permanence is inextricably linked with leakage. If communities are allowed to harvest a certain percentage of the annual biomass growth in terms of dead and fallen trees, manually harvested grass and mature bamboo poles, they will be more willing to protect the growing trees.
In this case, carbon sequestration credits can be calculated by subtracting annual biomass harvest from total annual biomass growth on a specific project site. CCX already incorporates this element by paying for only 80 per cent of the eligible forestry offsets. The balance of 20 per cent is saved in a CCX forest carbon reserve pool to account for any net losses in the carbon stocks. These reserves may be sufficient to fulfil local communities' annual biomass needs.
IV. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT FROM CARBON TRADING
Carbon credits generated by existing projects operated by Seva Mandir and the Foundation for Ecological Security are worth about $374,600 per year on CCX (see table 2), all of which represents potential additional income for local farmers. TIST already sells carbon credits on a project basis and the effects of selling on CCX would be mixed. The CCX market price tends to be lower than what TIST is able to sell for on a case-by-case basis but, on the other hand, it could raise its volume substantially by selling on CCX. However, TIST would need to reduce its transaction costs in order to manage with lower sale prices on CCX.
This additional income has the potential to extend local conservation efforts, reduce livelihood pressure on forests and provide for the sustenance needs of many poor families. The experience of TIST demonstrates that, for many farmers, carbon sales are the primary source of cash income. Farmers often reinvest their carbon sequestration income in agriculture or use it to pay for important household expenses. For instance, TIST formed the Salsa group in 2003 with 12 farmers. Since then, the group has planted 28,923 trees and has encouraged many neighbouring farmers to form groups and grow trees. Over the past three years, the Salsa group has received Rs. 57,114 ($1,428) as carbon payments from TIST. This money has improved the economic status of many group members and has helped them to reinvest it in agriculture.
Similarly, community members interviewed in areas where the Foundation for Ecological Security and Seva Mandir are active say that carbon payments will give them a direct incentive to conserve local forests. For instance, in Chitravas in Rajasthan, Joint forest management activities over 276 hectares of forest land have yielded benefits for local villagers, mainly by providing non-timber forest products and some employment opportunities under the Foundation project activities. The sale of carbon credits totalling 1,266 tCO 2 per year from these forests could generate additional annual income of $5,064. When divided equally amongst all households in the village, these carbon payments will be equivalent to a 15 per cent increase over the average cash income of $100 per year for most of the poor households.
Additional funding support for forestry
Carbon payments also represent opportunities for attracting additional funding support. Many Indian non-governmental organizations which are actively involved in forestry interventions are in constant need of financial assistance. Seva Mandir for example, submits regular project proposals to international donor organizations to fund its forestry activities (Seva Mandir, 2006) . Similarly, the Foundation for Ecological Security receives financial support from the Indian National Dairy Development Board and from some international organizations. This funding support is however, often limited and insufficient to meet local requirements.
Carbon markets, on the other hand, are growing rapidly (Point Carbon, 2007) . Demand for carbon credits on CCX has risen sharply, with trade of 11.85 million tCO 2 during the first six months of 2007 already exceeding the total volume of 10.27 million tCO 2 transacted in 2006 (CCX, 2007) . Combined with a 300 per cent increase in the average price of tCO 2 on CCX between January 2004 and January 2007, CCX presents an attractive opportunity for forestry projects to raise money through the sale of carbon sequestration credits. A relationship with CCX can, in fact, help Seva Mandir and the Foundation for Ecological Security learn the intricacies of international carbon trading, while also helping all three organizations to find more carbon buyers to generate additional financial support for their forestry programmes. As international carbon rules are still being formulated, these organizations also have an opportunity to share their own experience of how these rules actually play out in the field and suggest necessary modifications.
Benefits for CCX and its members
CCX is a voluntary emission reduction programme. However, rising environmental awareness, the growing threat of global warming and changing market perceptions have convinced more and more firms to commit to emission reduction, leading to increasing demand for carbon credits on CCX. To date, CCX has mainly met this demand for carbon credits from emission reduction and carbon sequestration programmes within the Unite States. However, judging from its recent growth, demand will grow rapidly in the coming years, and CCX has started looking for additional carbon credit suppliers in order to avoid a sharp increase in prices. The three organizations covered in this study are well qualified to act as suppliers for CCX.
Building a relationship with organizations like TIST, the Foundation for Ecological Security and Seva Mandir will help CCX to tap into a relatively large supply of carbon sequestration credits. For its part, CCX will also get to experience the particulars of a relationship with grass-roots forestry projects, which may gain more significance as carbon markets continue to grow. Finally, CCX members can gain satisfaction and goodwill from the fact that their carbon payments are able to contribute to sustainable development initiatives among poor communities in India.
V. VILLAGE-LEVEL ISSUES CONCERNING CARBON TRADING
This section presents the findings of qualitative investigations among programme officials and villagers participating in the three community forestry programmes. They include concerns about transaction costs, the implications of converting land under food crops to forestry, managing carbon sequestration on common lands and problems arising from sequestering carbon from intensive plantations of timber tree species. This section looks at these issues in detail and discusses some relevant alternatives.
Reducing transaction costs
The transaction costs of a carbon sequestration project include negotiating, contracting, implementing and monitoring costs. These costs are usually high when establishing new projects or when looking to sell carbon credits through the more formal compliance markets governed by the Kyoto Protocol. For instance, Krey (2004) estimates that emission reduction projects in India that wish to sell carbon credits through the Clean Development Mechanism face an average transaction cost of $74,885 per project. For the three community forestry projects considered here, transaction costs will be lower in dealing with CCX than the Clean Development Mechanism, but monitoring and verification costs are still expected to be substantial at about $16,000 per project. These project costs will reduce the proportion of carbon revenue that ultimately reaches local farmers.
One way to reduce these costs is to aggregate carbon credits from individual farmers and then sell them in one lot. The aggregator thus avoids the cost of setting up multiple contracts by establishing a single contract with CCX on behalf of all the local participants. TIST already plays this role by purchasing carbon offsets from local farmers and then selling them to international buyers in aggregated lots. Since the Foundation for Ecological Security and Seva Mandir will be new to carbon trading, they can consider collaborating together to act as a common aggregator for their target participants. Together, they can promote market access and ensure that poor households can participate in the sequestration programme, with equitable sharing of carbon benefits amongst the community members.
Monitoring and verification are major transaction costs. They would be substantial for Seva Mandir and the Foundation for Ecological Security where individual carbon sites are located far away from each other. One possible solution is to introduce site-specific monitoring through hand-held Global Positioning System (GPS) units, which are relatively inexpensive and easy to use and can help to provide more rigorous tracking of carbon plantations. TIST has already trained village-based volunteers to take field measurements using GPS. A single carbon expert in the central office then uses the field measurements to calculate carbon sequestration credits for each site.
Food insecurity concerns
Many smallholders in India meet their food requirements from their farms and local forests. As the rural population continues to grow, there is a demand for additional agricultural land to grow food crops. Land that is locked in multi-year carbon plantations cannot be used for food production and some villagers interviewed in this study expressed fear that local communities will be threatened with food insecurity if they invest heavily in carbon sequestration. TIST addresses this issue by promoting carbon sequestration primarily on marginal and low-productivity lands, which have a low substitutability for agriculture and are thus well suited to long-term carbon plantation projects.
A greater concern is that farmers who do not understand long-term contracts will enter into agreements without understanding their full implications, and when they want to cut their trees, they may find they are legally unable to do so. In fact, the Foundation for Ecological Security and Seva Mandir are well aware of this concern and it is one reason why they hesitate to link their community forestry programmes to CCX. Helping farmers appreciate the nature of carbon sequestration contracts and the need to understand legal obligations fully is an important role for non-governmental organizations to play should they decide to help link farmers to CCX.
Carbon sequestration on common lands
A large proportion of the land in rural India is common land, including revenue lands, Forest Department lands and panchayat grazing lands. Although village communities can obtain permission from the respective authorities to manage these lands for a fixed period of time, there is no provision to carry out carbon sequestration projects on them. Villagers and project managers alike pointed out that, as carbon payments become more significant, there is a possibility that the Forest Department and local panchayats may, in fact, stop transferring management rights to local communities.
For example, Nayakheda village in Rajasthan obtained permission from the local panchayat to manage plantations on 29 hectares of common pasture land. The villagers also planted trees on 100 hectares of individually owned lands. These plantations are sequestering 236 tCO 2 per year, worth $946. However, the panchayat is now threatening to take over the pasture land, which is a direct result of the fact that the villagers have identified a way to generate cash income from these lands as opposed to income in kind, like fodder, fuelwood and non-timber forest products. If this land and similar panchayat land were to start selling carbon credits, the problem would be greatly exacerbated. This potential area for conflict needs to be resolved soon. A practical solution may be to share carbon payments between local communities and the respective authorities.
Even where the panchayat or Revenue Department grants access rights, experience shows that poorer and politically weaker groups may have difficulty maintaining access to common lands. As carbon sequestration services make these lands more valuable, powerful landowners may grab them and drive the poor away, further threatening their livelihoods (Kerr and others, 2006) . There is ample evidence both of private encroachment on common lands (e.g. Jodha, 1997) and of de facto appropriation of productive common lands by some groups at the expense of other groups.
14 In this regard, the approach of the Foundation for Ecological Security developing farm forestry cooperatives-may be a viable way to generate secure access to land for carbon sequestration with equitable sharing of benefits. The Foundation has worked extensively with such cooperatives to develop local pastures across several states in India. The cooperatives obtain long-term leases from local governments to regenerate pastures and to share benefits amongst their members. As a result, they are successful not only in improving the productivity of local resources but also in securing tenure rights for their members (Foundation for Ecological Security, 2005).
Intensive plantations with per tree carbon payments
TIST carbon payments to local farmers are calculated on the basis of the actual number of live trees, irrespective of the tree species being planted. This system introduces two problems. First, farmers tend to look at carbon payments on a per acre basis rather than per tree. For instance, an acre of densely planted casuarina (1,600 trees per acre) can earn $59.2 per annum, whereas an acre of mango (which can only be planted at a rate of 100 trees per acre) earns only $3.7 per annum. Second, the densely planted trees like casuarina and eucalyptus fetch high prices for sale as timber and, as the trees mature, the pressure will grow to cut them. The TIST per-tree carbon payment is a constant annual payment, so while it is very attractive when the tree is first planted, it becomes less so as the tree grows and gains value as timber or pulp. Selling the tree for timber or pulp would undermine its carbon sequestration contribution, potentially eliminating any carbon benefits accrued over the entire life of the tree.
Fruit trees such as mango have the potential to be much more effective as sources of carbon sequestration. Mango (Magnifera indica) is a long-gestation tree crop that generates income by bearing fruit, so in contrast to casuarina and eucalyptus, the incentive to cut the tree shrinks as it matures. The long-term potential for carbon sequestration is, therefore, probably greater for fruit trees than for timber trees, but the higher annual payment per acre of timber trees under the TIST payment scheme may lead to more timber tree plantations, which may eventually be cut down, thus reversing the carbon sequestration gain.
In addition, intensive plantations can be ecologically harmful, especially if they are raised as monocultures and comprise species such as eucalyptus that require large quantities of water. Instead, experts recommend slow-growing indigenous species that do not disturb the local ecology (Farley, Jobbagy and Jackson, 2005) . Therefore, as TIST-India's carbon initiative grows, it will need to come up with new payment systems that provide economic incentives to local farmers to plant ecologically diverse tree crops rather than relying primarily on fast-growing monocultures.
VI. CONCLUSION
The rules for carbon sequestration projects under the Kyoto Protocol are often perceived as being too rigid and difficult to follow (Murphy, 2006) . In comparison, the CCX rules for carbon sequestration projects are relatively simple and easy to follow. From the perspective of local communities, some modifications in these rules will make them even more attractive. For instance, CCX only allows trading in above-ground carbon stored in live matter. However, forests often fix substantial amounts of carbon in the soil as organic matter. If CCX is able to develop usable protocols for measuring below-ground carbon in forestry projects, it will greatly increase the incentive for communities to participate in carbon sequestration activities.
15
Seva Mandir, the Foundation for Ecological Security and TIST can all potentially sell carbon sequestration credits on CCX on behalf of local farmers, and establishing a relationship with CCX may, in fact, open avenues for carbon trading with other international players. A viable strategy in this regard would be to start with simple payment arrangements on small contiguous sites that are easy to monitor and administer. Experience gained during these pilot projects may come in handy in expanding the scale of operations as international demand for carbon sequestration credits continues to grow. Such performance-based payments may also ensure that local communities have a long-term stake in conserving these plantations. For a global society, this relationship may open ways to achieve a win-win situation for both environmental conservation and economic development.
Finally, and most importantly, carbon sequestration programmes have the potential to help alleviate rural poverty. This potential will, however, remain unfulfilled unless policymakers and various carbon players make conscious efforts to elicit participation from the poor. In order to benefit small and marginal farmers in developing countries, carbon sequestration projects will also need to incorporate improvements in carbon accounting and innovations that can reduce the transaction costs inherent in their implementation. Institutions such as farmers' cooperatives and federations under the leadership of non-governmental organizations can further ensure that carbon payments are channelled to the poor. Only then can carbon sequestration truly lead to local sustainable development.
